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November 19, 2026

Billington Critical Infrastructure 2026 Field Notes

Opening keynote, Billington Critical Infrastructure CyberSecurity Summit, San Antonio, November 17-18, 2026.

Billington Critical Infrastructure 2026 Field Notes

A shared mission

"Cybersecurity is a shared mission." That's how Texas Cyber Command Chief TJ White put it on November 17, the day his agency named 63 companies to Project Watershed 250. It's a no-cost pilot to help Texas water and wastewater utilities defend themselves. CPLANE is one of the 63.

The announcement landed as the first Billington Critical Infrastructure CyberSecurity Summit opened in San Antonio. For two days, leaders from four lifeline sectors (energy, communications, transportation, and water) worked the same problem from different angles.

I went to listen and learn.

Here's what I heard, and what it means for the people who keep the water running.

The threat is patient

The FBI's cyber leadership opened the summit with a blunt frame: securing infrastructure is a national security issue. They named Volt Typhoon, the Chinese state campaign that has stealthily pre-positioned inside U.S. utilities. The goal isn't to take down a city. It's to slow the military by hitting the local systems that bases and their towns depend on.

Water came up by name. No one has died from an attack on a water plant (yet), but there have been plenty of boil-water orders. And a lot of the hardware is old.

Three panelists on the Billington CyberSecurity stage, one in a suit and two in uniform.
Poland's Cyber Command on the energy sector under cyber attack.

Poland showed what patience looks like in practice. In December 2025, attackers hit a combined heat and power plant, a second smaller plant, and dozens of renewable energy sites on the same day. Poland's national CERT has since published the details. At the smaller plant, the attackers didn't come through the front door. They crossed a private cellular network from a wind farm, found a controller still on its default password, and used it to reach the plant. The steam turbine stopped. So did the system that treats the plant's process water (follow up report here).

The lesson from both: by the time you see them, they've been there a while.

Never too small

If one line ran through both days, it was this: you are never too small to be a target. Most victims aren't the big names. They're the small systems with thin staff and old equipment.

Littleton, Massachusetts, is the case everyone knows. Its municipal electric and water utility is where Volt Typhoon was found. The network was flat, so once the attackers were in, they were in. They had the admin password. Since then, Littleton has separated its networks and started moving to device and person identity. It isn't finished, and the older controllers are still there. That's honest, and it's normal.

This summer brought the point home again, when coordinated attacks hit community water systems across Minnesota.

Texas has more than 7,400 public water systems and 3,000 wastewater facilities serving 31 million people, according to Texas Cyber Command. The state's CIO put it simply: everyone is a target, rural systems included. And don't abandon the basics.

How they get in

The panels kept naming the same doors:

  • Remote access nobody manages. Cellular modems at lift stations, vendor VPNs without multi-factor authentication, upgrades pushed by whoever has the login.
  • "Disconnected" systems that aren't. Undocumented connections show up in almost every assessment. And a truly disconnected plant creates manual work that small utilities don't have the people to do.
  • Default passwords and old vulnerabilities. Flaws from 2020 and 2021 are still getting past small operators.
  • Controllers you can't patch or replace. When parts are scarce, utilities buy them online, and knockoffs get in. One panel put it plainly: black-box systems are harder to secure than open ones you can see inside.

AI is speeding all of this up. The FBI flagged open-source, AI-driven attack tools that are spreading fast. Security researchers have watched them move from stolen credentials to the next system in about a minute. Defenders are getting stretched.

Everything depends on everything

Billington put four sectors in one room on purpose. By the end of day two, I could see why.

Poland Cyber Command slide of mission vital infrastructure, with water supply listed alongside energy, communications, defence industry, healthcare, and transport.
Poland treats water supply as Mission Vital Infrastructure, defended alongside energy, communications, and transport. Slide: Poland Cyber Command at Billington (public release).

A rail panelist pointed out that the chlorine water plants use for treatment moves by rail. A Texas water leader summed up his job as keeping the lights on so the water keeps flowing. Remote lift stations and tanks talk to the plant over cellular networks, and in Poland, a cellular network was the path the attackers took. A NIST researcher flipped the usual frame: water isn't only a target, it's a dependency that hospitals, data centers, and factories can't run without.

The moderator of the supply chain panel named the gap underneath all of it: the space between cyber and physical. Most organizations don't know what they depend on until it stops.

So I agree with TJ White that cybersecurity is a shared mission. Water needs power. Power needs communications. And all of it moves on transportation. A small water utility sits in the middle of that web, often with the fewest people to defend it.

What to do now

Start with the basics. They're free, and they're where most attacks succeed or fail.

  • Take a self-assessment. AWWA's Cybersecurity Guidance and Assessment Tool and EPA's water assessment tool are both free and built for utilities of every size.
  • Fix the front door. Change default passwords, turn on multi-factor authentication, and get your free CISA vulnerability scan. Many of the Watershed 250 partners are excellent at exactly this.
  • Call your state rural water association. The National Rural Water Association and its state associations offer free technical assistance to small systems, and its cybersecurity center offers complimentary WaterISAC membership to eligible members serving fewer than 10,000 people.

Then move to the operational side, where the plant actually runs:

  • See your attack surface. List every controller, and every remote path into it: modems, VPNs, vendor access. As TJ White's team kept saying, you can't defend what you can't see.
  • Separate IT from OT. Littleton's lesson is that a flat network turns one break-in into full access.
  • Plan for the controllers you can't patch. If parts come from eBay, that's a supply chain risk, not just a budget line.
  • Practice. Run a tabletop with your operators and IT staff in the same room. Maryland now counts tabletops and games toward its annual training requirement.

That third step is where CPLANE works: helping utilities move to a control system they can separate and secure, without shutting the plant down. We're one of 63 partners in Project Watershed 250, alongside companies that find, watch, and guard OT systems. The point of a shared mission is that no one does all of it alone.

Appendix: state water cybersecurity requirements

Nine states now have binding cybersecurity rules for water or wastewater systems that we could confirm at the source. Seven require a cybersecurity program or plan; two require incident reporting. Rules change, so check each source for the latest.

  • Maryland. Program. Cyber point of contact, annual training, 1-hour incident reporting, cyber in emergency plans; larger systems add state standards, zero trust, and a maturity assessment every 2 years. Covered: all community water and sewer systems; enhanced rules above 3,300 customers.
  • New York. Program. Vulnerability analysis, cybersecurity program, training, 24-hour incident reporting; in effect March 11, 2026, full compliance by January 1, 2027. Covered: community water systems serving more than 3,300 people; more above 50,000.
  • New Jersey. Program. Cybersecurity program, membership in the state's cyber integration cell, incident reporting. Covered: community water systems with more than 500 connections.
  • Indiana. Program. Baseline vulnerability assessment, incident reporting, biennial certification. Covered: water and wastewater utilities using computerized systems.
  • Tennessee. Program. Cybersecurity plan updated every 2 years, annual filing, 72-hour incident reporting. Covered: regulated water, wastewater, electric, and gas utilities.
  • Pennsylvania. Program. Cybersecurity plan with self-certification; report cyber attacks that interrupt service. Covered: PUC-regulated (mostly investor-owned) water utilities.
  • Rhode Island. Program. Cyber risk management plan and emergency response plan. Covered: wastewater treatment facilities.
  • Texas. Reporting. Report cybersecurity incidents to TCEQ immediately; incidents also go to DIR. Covered: public water systems.
  • Oklahoma. Reporting. Report cybersecurity incidents to the Corporation Commission. Covered: commission-regulated water utilities.

Federal bill to watch: the Water Cyber Shield Act of 2026 (S. 5368) would direct EPA to set tiered cybersecurity standards, add $300 million a year each for drinking water and wastewater cybersecurity, and extend federal incident reporting to state and locally owned systems. It was introduced August 7, 2026.

Know of a state we missed? Tell us, and we'll add it.

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